When General Abdourahamane Tiani seized power in Niamey in July 2023, he justified the coup partly by accusing the elected government of failing to contain jihadist violence. Within months, the new junta expelled French forces and pressured the United States into withdrawing more than 1,000 troops, ending Washington's second-largest military presence in Africa. Russia's Africa Corps arrived in April 2024 to fill the gap. The bet was that a new partner would succeed where the old one hadn't.
A first strike on the capital's most sensitive site
On the night of January 28-29, 2026, more than 30 fighters stormed Diori Hamani International Airport and the adjacent Air Base 101 in Niamey, using motorcycles, drones, and mortars. Nigerien authorities said they killed 20 attackers and captured 11 more; four soldiers were wounded and several aircraft were damaged. The Islamic State's Sahel Province later claimed responsibility via its Amaq propaganda channel, describing a "surprise and coordinated attack" that inflicted "significant damage." It was one of the group's most ambitious operations to date, striking a facility that hosts the headquarters of the Niger-Mali-Burkina Faso Joint Force roughly ten kilometers from the presidential palace.
The site's sensitivity went beyond its military value. According to Le Monde, roughly 1,000 tonnes of uranium concentrate β "yellowcake" extracted from the former Orano mine at Arlit β was sitting in storage at the airport complex at the time, seized by the junta amid its dispute with the French mining company. The shipment was reportedly of interest to a Russian buyer, but the reported deal remained stalled. There's no evidence the attackers were after the uranium specifically, but its presence made an already strategic location β Niger's air force, its regional counterterrorism command, and a contested uranium stockpile all in one place β an unusually sensitive target.
Accusations without evidence, and a claim that came later
Hours after the assault, Tiani appeared on state television and accused the presidents of France, Benin, and CΓ΄te d'Ivoire of sponsoring the attack, offering no evidence. All three governments denied any involvement; a French military spokesman called the claims "clearly information warfare." The Islamic State's Sahel affiliate subsequently claimed the attack.
Moscow's response
Russia's Foreign Ministry confirmed that its forces had taken part in the response. Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said Moscow "strongly condemns this latest attack by terrorists seeking to undermine the stability of the Confederation of Sahel States" and pledged support for Niger's government. According to Moscow's Foreign Ministry, "the attack was repelled through the joint efforts of the Russian Ministry of Defence's African Corps and the Nigerien armed forces." Russian officials also suggested that external forces may have provided instructor and technical support to the attackers, but offered no public evidence for the claim. Tiani later visited the Russian base in Niamey to thank Africa Corps personnel for their "high level of professionalism."
A second, deadlier attack five months later
On June 18, militants struck the same airport complex again. The attack killed 11 security personnel and two civilians, while Nigerien authorities said 22 attackers were also killed. The initial Reuters report said there had been no immediate claim of responsibility. JNIM, al-Qaeda's Sahelian affiliate, subsequently claimed the attack. The Associated Press described the assault as evidence that jihadist groups are increasingly taking the fight into urban centers, targeting strategic infrastructure as well as rural areas.
A widening network, not a lone group
Perhaps the more consequential story isn't either single attack but what security researchers say is happening behind them. The Institute for Security Studies has reported growing cross-border mobility and cooperation among jihadist networks spanning the Lake Chad basin and the Sahel. The Islamic State's Sahel Province and Islamic State West Africa Province have been linked through broader Islamic State structures, while the Nigeria-based Maktab al-Furqan has been described by researchers as a coordinating mechanism for Islamic State branches in the region. Lakurawa, a militant group active in northwestern Nigeria, has also been linked to the wider Islamic State network. Reports of fighters, fuel, weapons and financing moving between theaters point to an increasingly interconnected regional threat, although the precise extent of operational coordination remains difficult to independently verify.
A kidnapping that reached the presidential palace's doorstep
The insecurity hasn't stayed confined to military installations. In October 2025, three armed men abducted Kevin Rideout, an American missionary pilot, from outside his home in Niamey β about 90 meters from the presidential palace. He spent more than nine months in captivity, reportedly held for a period in neighboring Mali, before his release in August 2026. According to Reuters, authorities in eastern Libya under military commander Khalifa Haftar played a central role in securing his freedom. The accounts of how it happened diverge sharply: four sources said a deal was negotiated and a ransom paid, without disclosing the amount; one source inside Haftar's own forces claimed instead that an elite commando unit carried out a military rescue operation inside Mali. Two sources said the negotiations were led on the ground by Cherif Ould Tahar, a Malian businessman with ties to regional armed groups and smuggling networks. No jihadist group publicly claimed responsibility for the kidnapping itself.
Rideout was accompanied home by FBI officials; the State Department declined to comment on the circumstances of his release, and the White House did not respond to questions about Haftar's role. Washington had made the case a priority for months, and U.S. officials reportedly sought airspace access for surveillance efforts aimed at locating him. Rideout later thanked Haftar's son, Saddam, and the Libyan National Army for arranging his release and safe passage. The episode underscores how Haftar has positioned himself as a security broker across the Sahel β leverage he can potentially use to build goodwill with Washington.
The open question
None of this means the junta's approach has failed outright β Niger has avoided the kind of large-scale territorial losses that have battered parts of neighboring Mali. But the premise behind expelling Western forces was that a new partnership would make the country safer. Three years in, the capital's most strategic military site has been hit twice, an American was held hostage a short walk from the seat of government, and rival jihadist networks operating across the region appear increasingly interconnected. The question hanging over Niamey isn't whether the security situation has changed. It's whether swapping partners actually changed it for the better.